

OS 583-69

SECRET

5 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Carver, Special Assistant for
Vietnam Affairs, Office of the DCI

SUBJECT : Reminder Concerning Your Lecture for
[redacted]
on 30 September 1969

1. This memorandum is intended as a reminder of your agreement to
lecture [redacted] this month and it will recap briefly the main points
covered by me in a conversation with you last week.

[redacted]

3. You are scheduled, along with Ambassador Sullivan, on
30 September 1969. The Ambassador will speak from 1000 to 1200 hours, we
will break for lunch, then you will speak from 1330 to 1500 hours. We
will have a number of students join us for lunch as we did last time. We
have arranged a special flight for you and the Ambassador.

[redacted]
[redacted] You should, therefore, be back in your
office at 1600 hours.

4. Your talk, entitled "The Role of the Agency in Internal Defense
Programs," [redacted]

[redacted] Also, you will recall that
[redacted] from your office, and several other recently returned VNO
officers speak to our course the next day on Vietnam specifically. With
these points in mind, then, I would appreciate it very much if you could
structure your presentation to include the following points, using the
Vietnam experience as a springboard but extending from it to the broader

SECRET

considerations of our future involvement world-wide:

a. Given the nature of the tremendous commitment the U. S. developed in the Vietnam war and the demands it made upon the Agency's personnel and materiel resources, what innovations and new "chartered" responsibilities have or will become part of the Agency's role in the coming years as it faces internal security crises elsewhere.

b. What lessons have we learned from the Vietnam experience regarding the real utility of rural development and pacification programs in an underdeveloped country faced with an insurgency threat? How and when must the concepts be applied to assure an effective impact; when might they be useless appendages and some other technique deemed more appropriate?

c. There has been some talk in Washington circles that no one existing government agency can adequately meet the demands of a full-ranging counterinsurgency or internal security commitment to a foreign country and that a new agency, perhaps an affiliate of DOD, ought to be created for such a purpose. Is this valid or do you think the Agency can fulfill the task should another Vietnam-type crisis appear?

d. Whenever the Agency gets involved in some uniquely non-espionage sort of activity (i.e. developing cottage industries in a nation-building context), the explanation usually is that there was an urgent need that such be done and that AID or some other appropriate agency could not gear itself up quickly enough to meet the need or the deadline. Is this jack-of-all-trades capability likely to be strengthened in the Agency in coming years or will we divest ourselves of such as much as possible?

e. In the eyes of the White House and State, what sort of grades has the Agency achieved in its efforts to develop and support viable internal security programs in crisis areas? Where have we fallen short and in what ways? What must be done to improve our capability? (This can be manipulated into a brief pep talk for the students, if you so choose.)

5. I just reviewed the tape recording of your talk here last winter on the same subject and it was truly outstanding. If you still have your notes from that session, just dust them off and use them again. If not, I can send you a copy of the tape if that would help.

~~SECRET~~

6. Once again let me express my sincere appreciation for your help in arranging Ambassador Sullivan's visit here, and for your own kindness in accepting our invitation to speak.




25X1

Chief, Concepts Branch
Training, Staff II

25X1

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Adrse.
1 - Registry 
1 - OC-II-2-69 Speaker File
1 - CB Chrono

25X1

~~SECRET~~